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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
TWENTIETH REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee in the course of 1978.
During the year, the Committee held 11 sessions and the working parties drawn from its
own members or set up at its initiative met on many occasions.
At its session of 9 December 1977 it had elected its officers. It elected as chairman Mr
J. van Ypersele de Strihou, Office of the Prime Minister, Brussels, and as vice-chairmen
Mr S. Andersen, Joint-Governor of Danmarks Nationalbank, Mr N. Jordan-Moss
HM Treasury, London and Mr P. Jaans, Banking Control Commission, Luxembourg.
The terms of office of the new members will expire on 31 December 1979. A list of
members as at 31 December 1978 is annexed.
At its meeting of 5 and 6 June it celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its first meeting,
held on 4 June 1958. To celebrate this occasion, the present chairman, Mr van Ypersele,
invited the Committee and its former chairmen and vice-chairmen to a reception held on
5 June 1978. The written contributions of the former chairmen, and the speech given by
the present chairman are collected in a small brochure entitled 'Twenty years of the
Monetary Committee , which is available on request from the Committee s Secretariat.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1978.
INTRODUCTION
1. The expansion of world economic activity
continued to be moderate in 1978. Growth rates both
of production and world trade were similar to those
of 1977. The structure of balances of payments
altered greatly: on the one hand, the OPEC surplus
fell markedly, and the deficit of the non-oil
producing developing countries increased and, on the
other hand, the OECD countries went back into
surplus. Among these latter, developments were not
homogeneous: the United States' deficit worsened
further, but was more than compensated by the
improvement in the balances of other countries, parti-
cularly the Community and Japan.
. 2. The economic situation in the Community again
presented rather a contrast in 1978. On the one handNo C 240/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 25.
the results for growth and employment were
deceptive: growth of output remained mediocre
barely above , the level of 1977, and unemployment
continued to increase throughout most of the year.
On the other hand, further progress was achieved on
prices and external payments: the slow-down in the
rate of inflation continued, and was particularly
marked in those countries where it has been highest;
similarly, there was a substantial increase in the
Community current account surplus, and this
movement, which is primarily due to the improvement
in the terms of trade, was particularly marked in a
number of countries which had been in a relatively
weak position in previous years.
COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE
3. 1978 was a significant year for the Committee,
which played a vital role in the preparation and
development of the European monetary system, and
during the second half of the year devoted its time
almost exclusively to this question.
4. On 17 November 1977 the Commission
presented a communication to the European Council
of 4 and 5 December 1977 on the prospects of
economic and monetary union, and at its meeting of
19 December 1977, the Council had requested the
Committee along with the Economic Policy
Committee and the Committee of Governors, to
examine this communication. To this end the
alternates met on several occasions and submitted a
report to the Committee at its meeting of 4 April
1978, who then held an exchange of views on this
subject.
5. On 6 and 7 April 1978 the European Council
met in Copenhagen, and the conclusions of the
Presidency set out a list of objectives relating to the
economic and social situation. In particular, it stated:
2. The European Council has examined the
need for increased monetary stability both in the
Community and at world level.'
It requested the Council to take the necessary
measures to achieve these objectives.
The Council therefore, at its meeting of 17 April
1978, requested the Monetary Committee and the
Committee of Governors to continue their work on
the monetary problems in the Community and to
report back in Mayor June.
6. In response to this request, at its meeting of 
and 12 May, the Committee held a wide-ranging and
detailed exchange of views on ways of promoting
greater stability in exchange rate relationships
between EC member countries. This examination was
based on the following assumptions about any new
exchange rate system:
(a) It would 
currencIes.
applicable to Community all
(b) It would be symmetrical with rega~d to the
burden of adjustment.
(c) It would be supported by substantial credit
facilities.
The chairman presented an oral statement to the
Council of 22 May which summarized the
Committee s conclusions to date.
7. At its meeting of 5 and 6 June the Committee
continued its examination and drew up a report to
the Council and the Commission which contained the
so-called 'three variants , which were in fact, sets of
variants, for achieving exchange rate stability. These
were, In essence:
(a) The 'strict variant, involving obligations to
defend a nominal market rate  vis-a-vis  each
partner currency. Two alternatives were
envisaged here. Firstly, the re-entry of all member
currencies into 'the snake , but with an element of
flexibility in the form of a transitional period
during which wider margins or a flexible
procedure for changing central rates could 
applied. Secondly, a similar new system could be
created, but with additional features such as a
simplified procedure for small changes in central
rates, provision for temporary leave of absence
and elements of a common attitude to major third
currencIes.
(b) The ' weIghted index' variant whereby
intervention obligations would be defined by
reference to a weighted index, constructed either
on the basis of the European unit of account
(EUA) or effective exchange rates (weighted
according to the geographical distribution of
foreign trade) . Participating countries would
commit themselves to maintaining the index
within a given margin.
(c) The
' '
flexible' variant involving a system of
concerted fluctuations represented by a 'reference
zone' for the three currencies which were floating
individually and 'the snake' as a whole. There
were no commitments to defend margins, the
only obligations being: firstly, to abstain from25. 9. 79 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/3
measures likely to cause the exchange rate to
move out of its reference zone and, secondly, for
countries to submit to a consultation procedure
which would be triggered automatically if the
reference zones were breached or abandoned.
8. On 6 and 7 July the European Council met in
Bremen and examined a proposal for the creation of
closer monetary cooperation (through the setting up
of a European monetary system) leading to a zone of
monetary stability in Europe. The main principles of
the EMS were laid down in the Annex to the
conclusions of the Presidency, known as 'the Bremen
Annex
' .
9. The Committee was requested by the Finance
Council of 24 July 1978 to examine the system set out
in the Bremen Annex and report back to the Council
of 18 September. After three meetings of the
alternates and two meetings of the Committee, on
7 September 1978 it adopted an interim report on the
European monetary system, which dealt essentially
with the problems linked to the  numeraire  such as
the definition of central rates and margins, the
characteristics of the various systems (parity grid and
basket systems) and changes in central rates  and
interventions  such as intervention currencies
width of margins, and symmetry of intervention
obligations  and which also contained preliminary
considerations on the European Monetary Fund
(EMF) .
10. This report was considered by the Council at
its meeting of 18 September, which requested the
relevant Committees to continue their work in the
light of the discussions which had taken place in the
Council. Following preparation by the alternates, on
12 October 1978, the Committee adopted a report on
the European monetary system, which carried further
the examination in its interim report, in particular, on
the assumption that the EMS would be based on a
combined use of the ' parity-grid' formula and the
ECU basket' formula, the latter being used to
determine the 'degree of divergence' of participating
currenCIes.
11. This report was examined by the Council at its
meeting of 16 October, which concentrated its
discussion on the intervention rules and the
strengthening of credit mechanisms and requested the
Committees to continue their work and clarify certain
outstanding matters.
12. On 7. November the Committee adopted its
final report to the Council and the Commission on
the European monetary system (Annex I) after a long
discussion of the questions still pending.
This report was examined by the Council on 20
November and on the basis of this report, that of the
Committee of Governors and that of the Economic
P01icy Committee, the Presidency of the Council
prepared an overall report to the European Council.
13. The European Council met on  and 5
December and adopted a resolution on the
establishment of the European monetary system
(EMS), which was to begin on 1 January 1979.
The Committee is aware that the lasting success of
the EMS requires an improvement in coordination of
national economic policies and it is prepared to make,
within the existing framework its contribution to
secure an improved convergence of economic policies
between Member States as set out in its report to
Council and the Commission of 28 February 1978
(Annex II).
14. As in previous years the Committee carried out
regular examinations of the economic situations in
Member States, with particular reference to monetary
and exchange rate policy, and the use of monetary
targets as stated in its report of November 1976 (see
nineteenth annual report, paragraphs 8 to 10). In the
framework of these examinations, the Committee
discussed in particular the policies pursued by France,
Germany and the United Kingdom.
15. In addition as required by the Council
Decisions granting financial aid by the Community to
Italy and Ireland, the Committee was consulted on
the sitUation of these countries. In January the
Committee took note of a report prepared by the 
hoc  Working Party chaired by Mr de la Geniere
which presented an analysis of the economic situation
in Italy in 1977. In May the  ad hoc  Working Party
again presented a report to the Committee, and the
Committee adopted a report to the Council and the
Commission. Finally, another report to the Council
and the Commission was approved by the Committee
at its meeting of 18 and 19 July 1978 fixing the
fundamental and 'instrumental' objectives for 1978
and the fundamental objectives for 1979.
16. In February the Committee adopted a report
drafted by the  ad hoc  Working Party chaired by Mr
Andersen on the economic situation in Ireland
prospects for 1978 and the respect of the economicNo C 240/4 Official Journal of the European Communities 25.
policy conditions in 1977, which was submitted to the
Commission for information.
17. The Committee also devoted a significant pro-
portion of its time to international monetary
questions, in preparation for the interim Committee
meetings in April and September and the annual
meeting of the International Monetary Fund in
September.
The two principal questions with which the
Committee had to deal this year were the SDR (new
allocation, improvement of the characteristics 
valuation, interest rate, reconstitution obligation 
substitution account) and the review of quotas.
18. The Committee also examined various other
. matters, such as a proposal to amend the Community
loan mechanism, a proposal for a draft Third
Directive implementing Article 67 of the EEC Treaty
(Annex III), a proposal for refinancing by the Bank
for International Settlements of claims arISIng from
the medium-term financial assistance mechanism, and
several proposals to change the conversion rates for
national currencies into units of account for the
purposes of the common agricultural policy.
19. Finally, in the framework of the setting up of
the EMS, the Committee considered the Commission
proposals for Council Regulations changing the value
of the unit of account used by the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund; on the European
monetary system; and on the impact of the European
monetary system on the common agricultural policy,
as well as a proposal for a Council Decision
amending Decision 71/143/EEC setting up
machinery for medium-term financial assistance. It
also examined legal problems involved in the
implementation of the EMS, on the basis of a report
prepared by an  ad hoc  Working Party set up for this
purpose.
WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
20. The Working Party on Securities Markets met
five times in 1978 and continued to examine
developments in the capital markets of the Member
States and in the international bond markets, and also
/ discussed capital market policies.
At the request of the Monetary Committee it
prepared a draft opinion on the proposal for a draft
, Third Directive for the implementation of Article 67
of the EEC Treaty, which the Monetary Committee
adopted at its meeting of 5 and 6 June 1978 (see
paragraph 18).
21. The Working Party on the Harmonization of
Monetary Policy Instruments, a joint group of the
Committee and the Committee of Governors, met
several times in 1978. It continued its work on
intermediate objectives, with a detailed study of the
possible obstacles to their harmonization, and had
almost completed this by the end of the year. This
work should provide the corpus ' of a report which the
Working Party intends to present to its parent
Committees at the very beginning of 1979.
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ANNEX I
FINAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE EUROPEAN
MONETARY SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION
1. In accordance with the request from the Council at its
session of 16 October 1978, the Monetary Committee
hereby submits its final report on the system, outlined in the
summary of conclusions of the Presidency of the European
Council on 6 and 7 July 1978 and the Annex thereto relating
to the creation of closer monetary cooperation between all
Member States.
2. The European Council envisaged a durable and
effective scheme with a European currency unit (ECU) at its
centre and with all the basic features of the system outlined
from the outset. The Committee has examined a wide range
of issues in the perspective of the final stage of a European
monetary system (EMS), viz., the  numeraire,  intervention
and the European Monetary Fund. As a period of up to two
years has been provided for the establishment of the Fund in
its final form, the examination of this was preliminary and
only the transitional period has been treated in detail. It was25. 9. 79 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/7
considered essential that as implied in the Bremen Annex
the exchange rate system and the appropriate credit facilities
should come into being at the same time. The Committee
draws attention to the fact that legal measures 
Community, and possibly at national level, will be necessary
before the entry into force of the system.
3. The EMS must be seen in the context of the range of
policies needed to achieve a greater amount of convergenc
between the economies of the Member States and equally It
cannot be durable and effective unless it is backed by
complementary policies. As there are still important
divergences in the sitUations of Member States it will need
great effort on the part of all, both surplus and deficit
countries, and in all areas of policy if the system is to be
durable and effective. Countries must as a matter of
principle give a high priority to internal policy measures
rather than to exchange rate charges, otherwise the
effectiveness of the system would be jeopardized. The
associated questions of economic policy coordination have
been dealt with by the Economic Policy Committee.
4. The functioning of the system outlined in the following
paragraphs will require regular consultations betwe~n the
competent authorities, including the Monetary Committee.
II. NUMERAIRE
A. DEFINITION AND USE OF ECV
5. The Annex to the Bremen Communique states that the
ECU will be at the centre of the system.
6. The ECU, like the EVA, will be defined as a basket
containing specific quantities of the Member States
currencies; but there will be a procedure for re-examining
the weights. Some members suggested that the weights of
the currencies in the ECU be examined before the start of
the system. Others pointed out that this would create
problems for its use in other Community sectors.
1. The Committee is of the oplOlOn that a re-exami-
nation should take place every five years, or when the
weight of any currency has changed by a significant amount
for example 25 %, either of which examination mayor may
not result in a revision.
2. It is agreed that any reVlSlons must be mutu~lly
accepted, would be made in line with the underlYlOg
economic criteria and in such a way as not to change the
external value of the ECU at the moment of revision. Also
the process of revision should be carried out in such a way
as to minimize any interference with decisions to cha-nge
central rates.
The ECU will be used:
as the  numeraire,  e. each currency will have a central
rate against the ECU
as a divergence indicator
as a denominator of claims and liabilities arISlOg from
the intervention system
as a means of settlement between monetary authorities of
the EEc.
B. CHANGES IN CENTRAL RATES
9. While the EMS itself ought to contribute to reducing
divergences in economic performance, it should not prevent
remaining real disparities from being reflected in exchange
rates. There should therefore be sufficient flexibility in the
system, and, in addition to an appropriate range of credit
facilities (which would not themselves be a sufficient remedy
in all circumstances), there should be arrangements for
adjusting central rates by mutual agreement.
10.  The credibility of the new system depends upon
progressive convergence of economic performance, making
reliance on exchange rate changes gradually less important.
In the meantime, however, if they do become necessary,
they should not be delayed to the point at which .heavy
speculative pressure builds up. They should be implemented
as far as possible while the exchange markets are calm.
11. As regards the procedures to be established, it was
observed that a set of economic and technical criteria
implying automatic rules for central rate changes would
have the advantage of rendering the decisions formally
objective. But it would be impossible to devise a set of rules
which removed the need for applying judgement, and even if
it were possible, they would involve the risk of becoming
known and of inviting speculation on the prospective
realignment. Since this would not be a tenable course of
action, changes in central rates should therefore be made by
mutUal agreement rather than fixed rules.
III. INTERVENTIONS
A. INTERVENTION OBLIGATIONS
12. The ECU central rates would be used to establish a
grid of bilateral exchange rates around which fluctuation
margins would be fixed by applying a given percentage
margin. The resulting bilateral limits define the obligatory
intervention points. These would be announced to the
market.
13. The envisaged system would be based on a combined
use of the parity grid and the ECU basket formula, the latter
being used to determine 'the degree of divergence' of parti-
cipating currencies in order to draw certain consequences
for intervention rules, and/or other policies.
14.1. In this system, obligatory intervention would occur
when the bilateral limits were attained. Action would also beNo C 240/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 25.
taken by the monetary authorities as soon as a certain
spread, measured in terms of ECU had been exceeded.
14.2. The use of the ECU mentioned above would be
triggered by the attainment of a minimum spread (referred
to as 'the threshold of divergence ) between the central rate
expressed in ECU and the rate of the day expressed in the
same terms. This divergence threshold would be calculated
for each currency in such a way as to eliminate the influence
of disparities of weight on the probability of reaching the
threshold. It would be established in such a manner that 
currency could attain its divergence threshold before
reaching its bilateral limit, but would not necessarily do so.
The divergence threshold in ECU could be fixed at 75 % of
its maximum spread for each currency.
14.3. If a currency crossed its divergence threshold, there
is a presumption that action must be undertaken by the
monetary authorities of the country concerned.
14.4. This action would initially consist of diversified
interventions on the exchange market. The object of these
diversified interventions would be both to check divergent
trends and to alleviate the burden on currencies furthest
removed from a divergent currency; this would allow a
better distribution of intervention burdens. In the case of
persistent divergence other more basic measures would have
to be envisaged, in consultation.
More specifically, when a currency exceeded its divergence
threshold, the central bank concerned would, in principle, be
obliged to diversify its intervention practices:
(a) if the bilateral limit had not been reached, it would have
to commence intervention either in Community
currencies (see (c) below) and/or in dollars, to check
the divergent trend;
(b) if the bilateral limit had been reached, the obligation to
intervene would be not only in the currency furthest
removed from it but also, to alleviate the situation of
that currency, in dollars or in other Community
currencies close to their bilateral limit in the opposite
direction (see (c) below); 
(c) in order to facilitate the diversification of intervention, a
central bank should not oppose stabilizing interventions
in its currency, when its currency was relatively close to
a bilateral intervention limit.
14.5. If a central bank did not take action in the manner
indicated under (a) or (b) above, it would have to give
reasons for failing to do so in the context of concertation
arrangements; it would be required to indicate the whole
range of monetary policy measures it intended to take. If 
central bank as referred to under (c) above wanted to
oppose intervention in its currency, then it would have to
give reasons for doing so.
14.6. If, notwithstanding action under 14.4 (a) or (b)
above, a currency still remained beyond its divergence
threshold the monetary authorities of the country
concerned would be required to give an account of measures
it intended to adopt to overcome this divergence. A common
assessment of the situation would be made in the framework
of consultations in the Monetary Committee. These consul-
tation procedures should be reviewed periodically to ensure
that they are operating effectively.
15.1. All members
outlined in paragraph
agreement although
qualifications.
indicated. that the arrangements
14 above could provide a basis for
this was subject to certain
15.2. Firstly, since this system is in some respects more
strict than the present 'snake , certain members indicated
that they could agree as long as crossing the divergence
threshold involved not only intervention by the divergent
currency but also greater symmetry of obligations by deficit
and surplus countries alike in general adjustment policies.
They believe that if the currency of a creditor diverged, the
credits resulting from the interventions of this central bank
should be governed by special rules, more favourable to the
debtor, in so far as the currency of this latter was in itself
not divergent. Similarly, in cases where the consultation pro-
cedures set in train by the divergence of the currency of a
deficit country had not led to satisfactory adjustment
measures, that country s access to the short-term facility, at
least in respect of the portion in excess of a specified
amount, could be limited.
Some of these members also believe that, for the system to
work, it would be necessary, at least in a transitional phase
to allow for wider bilateral margins for countries presently
floating independently.
15.3. Secondly, other members, who are of the OpInIOn
that there should not be intervention obligations as soon as
the divergence threshold is crossed, and who are not
inclined to consider any necessity to disprove the
presumption to intervene, are prepared to envisage the
following procedure:
The crossing of the divergence constitute a presumption
to act to correct the situation. The actions to be taken
will be discussed in the normal concertation procedure
among central banks.
- If, after more than five days, the divergence remains,
central banks will consult formally with each other to
form a judgement whether one or several of the
following measures appropriate to the situation should
betaken:
further intervention
monetary measures
drawing on the credit facilities
other external and domestic policy measures.
Measures beyond the competence of central banks
concerned have to be referred to the appropriate authorities
for immediate action.
16. Whatever the solution adopted for the role of the
ECU as a divergence indicator it may be that intervention in
third currencies is carried out even before bilateral
intervention points are reached. A situation might also arise
in which such interventions in third currencies would also be
desirable to supplement obligatory interventions within the25. Official Journal of the European Cbmmunities No C 240/9
EMS- when the mandatory intervention points have been
attained for instance so as to avoid imposing on the
currency in opposition an excessive burden. Regardless of
the currency chosen, these interventions should, in principle,
be subject to prior consultation. There should be no
automatic or binding rutes for interventions in third
currencies; in particular; any having the effect of pegging
these currencies' exchange rates should be avoided.
B. WIDTH OF MARGINS
17. The present 'snake' margins of 2. 25 % would in all
casd remain unchanged for the currencies presently in that
system.
More generally, there was broad support that the maximum
spot margin between two currencies should be fixed at
25 % if the proposals of paragraph 1'4 were adopte
18.1. However certain members considered that the
maximum spot margin should exceed 2. 25 %. This would
still be in conformity with the Bremen principle as
interventions would normally take place before the bilateral
margins are reached, because of the divergence indicator.
18.2. More specifically, according to these members, the
. Bremen principle could be satisfied by a combination of
narrow ECU margins for all Community currencies and
wide general bilateral spreads. The present 'snake' limits
would remain fully intact for 'snake' members , but the ECU
margins would be set in such a way as to be met, in general
before attainment of all bilateral limits, including those in
the snake . There would thus be two possible bands of fluc-
tuation in the EMS.
19. Temporary suspension of defence of margins is to be
seen as an emergency provision. It is a possibility of last
resort. For a country to be able to have re~ourse to this
procedure, there must be the assumption that the
determining factors are of a temporary nature. A situation
could arise, however, in which these factors were not
reversed in which case a country would re-enter with a
different central rate. There would be technical
consequences if any currency temporarily ceased to defend
its margins. One possible solution for dealing with such
consequences might be to freeze the rate of that currency in
the ECu.
C. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE IMF
20. The system of intervention and the type of
intervention obligations set up within the EMS would have
to corp-ply with the IMF Articles of Agreement, in particular
as regards the new Article IV. The Community will supply
the IMF with the appropriate information on the workings
of the EMS.
IV. RELATIONS WITH THE ASSOCIATED
COUNTRIES
21. The Annex to the Bremen Communique states that
non-member States with particular close economic and
financial ties with the Community may become associated
members to the system. The central banks of these countries
should be given the opportunity of participating in the
European exchange rate system. Details of their parti-
cipation would be negotiated with the central banks of the
interested countries. In principle, they would be required to
intervene in the same way, and would participate in coordi-
nation mechanisms. They would also have access to very
short-term financing. Transactions . between the associated
central banks and the EMS could be recorded in accounts in
the name of these banks, to be kept by the Fund. However
the associated central banks would not participate in short-
and medium-term credit mechanisms, nor could their
currencies be included in the composition of the ECU
basket,
22. The precise nature of the links interested. countries
having dose economic and financial ties with the
Community would have to be considered by the appropriate
Community bodies.
V. THE FUND  (I)
23. The Committee has considered the Fund in the light
of the following principles: .
- An initial supply of ECU will be created against the
deposit of US dollars and gold (for example, 20 % of
the stock currently held by member central banks)'
- A credit system based on a comparable sum of member
currencies should be established.
Not later than two years after the start of the scheme
these arrangements will be consolidated in a single Fund.
24. The Committee has examined the problems of the
transitional period with a view to the rapid implementation
of the system.
Transitional period
A. CREDITS
25. During the transitional period before the setting up of
the EMF in its final form, the credit mechanisms could be
extended in the following way:
1.  The very short-term credit mechanism
26. For settling balances within the Community it has
been suggested by some members that it might be useful that
(') In ?rder to take acc:ou~t of the monetary situation of Luxembourg, when
setting up the EMF, It wIll be necessary to adopt a formula, which assigns a
separate quota to Luxembourg.No C 240/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 25.
the very short-term financing of an unlimited amount be
extended to 90 days from the end of the month. In this way,
there would be a greater probability for a reversal in the
debtor country position. Among these members some
maintain that the period should be unlimited for a
persistently divergent' creditor. This prolongation would
allow the existing 'snake' facilities of automatic renewal and
renewal by mutual agreement to be abolished, especially as
the extension of short-term credit would be complementary.
2.  Short- and medium-term credit
27. According to the Bremen Annex, the credit facilities
should be an amount of a comparable order of magnitude to
the deposit of US dollars and gold (e.g. 20 % of the stock
currently held by member central banks, which amounts to
about 25 000 million ECU). The use of ECU created against
member currencies will be subject to conditions varying with
the amount and the maturity; due account will be given to
the need for substantial short-term facilities up to one year.
28. It has been suggested that one way to achieve the
necessary increase in short-term credit would be a system of
drawing rights without conditionality divided among the
member central banks according to a key which could be
that of the present STMS. Each central bank would be able
to obtain a non-automatic credit in excess of its drawing
right.
If all or part of these drawing rights were activated, the
drawing country would be credited with the agreed amount
of ECU within the EMS. These ECU would be usable
for the same purposes as the ECU created against reserve
instruments. These operations would be done through the
EMCF.
The volume of drawing rights which could be effectively
drawn under this system, would amount, as long as the
credit facilities offered by the MTFA were not increased, to
a total of 20000 million ECU, of which about 45 % would
result from an increase in quotas and the rest from an
increase in extensions. Any Member State could semi-auto-
matically draw on its extension up to 150 % of its quota.
This proposal would involve an increase in the quotas and
extensions by a factor of about 3. 3. As soon as the MTFA
were increased there would be a corresponding reduction in
the volume of these drawing rights. 
29.1. This proposal which is in line with the Bremen
Annex met with broad support, but certain Member States
have serious objections for financial, technical and legal
reasons.
29.2. If, for any of these reasons, agreement could not be
reached on the remaining issues before the start of the
system, it would therefore be necessary to consider how the
existing STMS and MTFA could be extended. In that event
the credit arrangements would not be directly based on the
ECu. The table shows the present sItUation and two
solutions.
30. The first (German solution) concentrates on the total
of the financial obligations of the Member States. The
creditor quotas and extensions would be increased as shown
in columns (a) and (b) in the left-hand side of the table. The
MTFA would also be increased. The resulting maximum of
credit available is given on the right-hand side of the table.
31. The second solution, for which the right-hand side of
the table is most relevant, is based on the assumption that
25 000 million ECU of credit should be available on
1 January 1979. In so far as the MTFA is not increased
within the time available, this necessarily implies that the
whole increase will provisionally be borne by the STMS. It
will at least temporarily (until the MTFA can be increased)
have to be increased up to 20 700 million ECU from the
current total of 5 800 million. This can be achieved through
a combination of increases to debtor quotas and extensions
one example of which is given in the table.
32. There was broad agreement that short-term
unconditional credit should be extended to one year, but
some members thought that the present duration of
the STMS (three months with the possibility of one
prolongation) could in specific cases be prolonged for
another period of three months.
33. If it proved necessary to resort to solutions of the type
outlined in paragraphs 30 and 31, this should be without
prejudice to the adoption of a system fully conforming to
paragraph 2 of the Bremen Annex, for example based on the
supply of ECU as in paragraph 27. Work should continue
and action be taken so that such a system can be set up as
soon as possible and, in any case, within two years from the
inception of the EMS.
34. Whereas the Committee had devoteD considerable
attention to the working of the Fund, the considerations
which follow and those in the Annex concerning the Fund in
its final form are only of a preliminary natUre. Although
they are not an agreed position of the Committee to the
same extent as the preceding sections they are nevertheless
presented here so as to indicate the extent of the problems.
B. AN ECU SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
35. A fund of ECU will be set up.
During the transitional period and without prejudice to
definitive solutions it could be decided that each country
would deposit in the form of swaps 20 % of its gold and
reserves in third country currencies. This arrangement would
have the advantage of avoiding the questions of exchange
risk (see Appendix).
There will have to be a periodic procedure for ensuring that
each central bank maintains a deposit of at least 20 % of
these reserves with the system.P
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Appendix
THE FUND IN ITS FINAL FORM
A. THE USE OF THE RESOURCES
The use of ECU created against reserve assets
1. Given that these ECU are the counterpart of freely
available or employable reserve assets, their use will be free
and unconditional. They will specifically serve as instru-
ments for settlements within the EMS by transfer between
debtOr and creditor central banks. It is understOod that a
central bank should not use its ECU to diversify its
exchange reserves.
2. For settling balances within the Community, it has
been suggested by some members that it might be useful that
very short-term financing of an unlimited amount be
extended to 60 or 90 days from the end of the month. In
this way there would be a greater probability for a reversal
in the debtOr country s position.
3. Technically, the deposit of reserve assets by central
banks as a counterpart to the creation of ECU does not
fundamentally alter the procedures for intra-Community
settlements. However, this mechanism would have three
main possibilities for development: to facilitate, for certain
countries, the activation of reserve assets such as gold; to
constitute a Community asset guaranteed by the reserves
made available to the Community by the Member States; or,
possibly, to guarantee loans issued by the Fund outside the
Community.
4. The above interpretation given to the deposits of
reserve assets is considered too limited by some members,
but others think that it is an important first step leading to a
development of the Fund.
The use of ECU created against national currencies
5. The EMS will also have at its disposal credit facilities
based on ECU created against national currencies. The ECU
so created would be indistinguishable from the ECU created
against reserve assets; they would be used as means of
settlement within the Community and would be convertible
intO other currencies, including non-Community currencies.
In this connection, a liquidity or ' scarce currency' problem
could arise within the EMS to the extent that the distri-
bution of the financing provided by the Fund would differ
systematically from that of contributions.
B. CONSTITUTION OF RESOURCES
By the deposit of reserve assets
1. There are four elements here: the basis for calcu-
lation, the instruments, the amount and the legal nature of
the deposits.
2.  The basis /or calculation:  considering the very
different composition of monetary reserves in the various
Member States, the basis for calculating reserves to be
deposited in the Fund could include all reserve elements
including SDR and reserve positions in the IMF. A practical
formula to determine this basis could be to refer to figures
for official gross reserves published by national monetary
authorities. Another possible solution could be that the basis
for calculation be the same as the elements to be deposited
e. at the beginning and provisionally, only third country
currencies and gold. Gold assets would naturally have to be
valued at the same price for all countries and, as there is no
obvious price, any method chosen could be considered
arbitrary. Deriving the price from the market price would
however avoid anything that might be interpreted as the
setting of a new official price for gold and the central banks
would still, of course, be free to value their gold at any price
they chose in their balance-sheets.
According to one proposal, the basis for calculation should
be determined individually for each country in the measure
for example, of 20 % of the relevant reserve assets. This
proposal has the advantage of being simple, but is not unani-
mously shared. Another proposal is that the basis for calcu-
lation be determined generally for the Community as a
whole. This second proposal would require a key of distri-
bution for which different solutions are conceivable (e.g.
quotas in short-term monetary support, weight in the ECU
basket, GNP, shares in intra-Col1\munity trade), which
would all mean that the various countries would each
contribute a different fraction of their reserves.
3.  Instruments:  According to the Bremen Communique
the reserve instruments to be deposited should include third
country currencies and gold. The depositing of gold does
however raise certain problems. Besides the evaluation
difficulties already mentioned, the fact that gold earns no
interest implies certain problems for the remuneration of
ECu.Finally, according to some there could be the risk of
creating the impression of restOring a monetary role to gold.
The question of the respective proportions in which gold
and dollars are to be deposited could be solved by setting,
them, for example, at 20 % of the stock of each instrument
currently held by individual member central banks (though
this solution would not be applicable if the chosen basis for
calculation included all reserve assets); a more complex
solution. would be to determine the amounts individually for
each instrument and each country. Reserve positions in the
IMF cannot be deposited with the EMF, nor, at least in the25. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/13
immediate future, can SDR. It has, however, been
emphasized that the Community should take the necessary
steps to obtain for the EMF the statUs of 'other holder , so
that it may receive deposits in SDR.
6.4.  Amount:  If 20  of the relevant reserves are
deposited initially in the Fund (the figure given as an
example in the Bremen Annex), then according to some
members:
under normal circumstances the requirements for
possible settlements could be accommodated, even
though precise calculations on the amounts effectively
necessary are not available and there furthermore is no
precise relationship between the amount of reserves of a
country and its financing requirements
public opinion will be shown that this step towards
European monetary unification has real significance.
Indeed, 20 % of the Community s reserves at present
means 25000 million EUA e).
There will furthermore have to be a procedure for perio-
dically adjusting the amounts of ECU held by the various
central banks as the reserves of the Member States change
and possibly as ECU are created within the system of credit
mechanisms.
There are two possible systems that might be considered:
Either:
the amount to be held in ECU would be adjusted solely
on the basis of variations in the amounts of reserve instru-
ments originally deposited. This would mean creating or
retUrning ECU worth 20 % of the amount of any
increase or decrease in a country s holdings of these
instruments. The ECU created within the system of
credit mechanisms would be distributed among member
countries according to rules governing the use of these
ECU;
or:
each central bank would be required to hold at least
20 % of its reserves in the form of ECU, which could be
the counterpart either of reserve instruments or of credit
operations.
5.  Legal questions:  These will largely depend on the
powers conferred on the Fund, particularly its powers over
the use of the assets deposited.
By deposit of national currency
7. The national currency element of the Fund constitutes
the credit facilities in the system, which, as stated in the
Bremen Annex, should be of a comparable size to deposits
of reserve instruments.
C. THE WORKING OF THE FUND
8. The following problems should be distinguished and
studied:
) Calculated by applying the dollar/EVA conversion rate as of 7 July 1978
(VS$ I = 0.80047 EVA),
The Fund's administrative infrastructure
9. It has been suggested that the present administrative
structUre of the EMCF should be used for the Fund. For
some members however it will be necessary either to make
major changes to the EMCF's administrative structure or
else to create a special new permanent organization
depending on the functions of the Fund.
The exchange risk and interest rates
10. Three Community solutions to the exchange risk
problem have been examined.
The first would be to ignore the consequences of any fluc-
tUations between national currency and the ECU, and to
make all conversions on the basis of the ECU rate of the
day.
The second would be to allocate shares of gains and losses
among the participants according to an apportionment
formula  for example, that used for budgetary contri-
butions, if exchange gains and losses were included in the
Community budget. If the exchange gains and losses were
put in a special account to be kept by the Fund, another
formula might be used.
The third solution, which would apply as long as deposits of
reserves were considered deposits in the strict sense, would
involve each country individually bearing the consequences
of all its deposits and transactions with the Fund, which
would keep accounts for each country with settlement of
balances at regular intervals.
11. On the matter of interest, rates on ECU created by
deposits of reserves should be distinguished from rates on
ECU created as a counterpart of deposits in national
currency.
12. For rates on ECU created by deposits of reserves, it
has been suggested that there should be only one rate of
interest, and also that contributing reserves to the Fund
against ECU should not result in member countries
foregoing gains that could have been realized elsewhere. In
the case of gold deposited with the Fund, the problems
could be solved by stipulating that all countries should
deposit gold and third country currencies as reserve instru-
ments in th'e same proportions. Another solution might be to
pay the same rate on all reserve ECU, with the member
countries paying a 'commission' to the Fund on the basis of
the amount of gold deposited.
Relations with other Community bodies
13. The extent to which independence is judged necessary
for the Fund's operations will determine whether the EMS,
and in particular the EMF, can be set up within the
framework of the EEC Treaty. It shall be stUdied how the
EMCF might manage the system in the initial stages, taking
on such tasks as the creation of ECU and the surveillance ofNo C 240/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 25.
their use under its present powers or with wider
responsibilities conferred on it by an amendment to Regu-
lation (EEC) No 907/73 of 3 April 1973. In any case
, '
the
legal problems of setting up and of organizing the Fund'
relations with other Community bodies will have to be
examined in detail.
ANNEX II
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON IMPROVING
COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
As requested by the Council, the Monetary Committee has
studied the Commission communication entitled 'Improving
coordination of the national economic policies' (COM(77)
443 final of 5 October 1977). It has confined its study to the
proposals falling within its terms of reference, which are to be found: 
(a) in the first indent of paragraph 3 (a) 'Indications with
figures showing how the budget surplus or deficit for
the coming financial year is to be used or financed'
(b) in paragraph 3 (b) 'The fixing of quantitative guidelines
. .. 
relating to changes in a significant monetary
aggregate
' ;
(c) in paragraph 3 (c) 'Discussions about "exchange rate
guidelines
" '
In this report, the Monetary Committee summarizes the
main remarks of its members, and puts forward a
compromise solution which might be the basis for an
agreement in the Council.
L REMARKS ON COMMISSION PROPOSALS
Members' reactions to the Commission proposals were of
two types:
1. General reactions to the spirit of the document;
2. Specific reactions to each of the three concrete
suggestions.
1. General reactions
General reactions may be summarized under three headings:
(a)  Generally fitvourable:  the Monetary Committee were
unanimous in sharing the concerns motivating the
Commission proposals. They apprQved of the general
economic motives for 'the proposals as well as the precise
aim of strengthening the coordination of short-term policies
so as to reduce the divergences that are hindering economic
and monetary union, and improve the convergence of
economic policies in the present situation.
(b)  An observation:  the members of the Monetary
Committee insisted as does the Commission document that
progress in monetary cooperation or coordination should go
in step with progress in general economic cooperation, both
when analysing the situation and when adopting a strategy
to deal with the actual situations of the different Member
States. If this was not taken into account, the attempt at
harmonization on the monetary level alone might well turn
out to be an empty formality, or even nuisance if it
introduced constraints that were ill-adapted to the actual
situation in each State.
(c)  suggestion:  the Monetary Committee cannot
recommend that the mechanism proposed by the
Commission be adopted unconditionally as described in the
reference document and the attached draft conclusion of the
Council; the Committee has reservations about some of the
components of this mechanism, although it fully endorses by
a very large majority the general policy that inspired the
Commission, and suggests that the, Council adopt an alter-
native, less precise, less ambitious in its essence and less
binding project which the Committee thinks should win the
approval . of the Member States and answer the
Commission s main preoccupations. This is the point of the
compromise described below.
2. The specific reactions
The reactions to each of the Commission s three monetary
proposals were as follows:
(a)  On the budget surplus or deficit:  almost all the members
of the Committee thought it was impossible to give detailed
figures on the various ways the budget surplus or deficit
might be used or financed. They gave the following main
reasons for this:
government loans cannot be announced before issue
w~thout seriously disturbing the financial market
government securities are often the main instrument in
open market operations, so the net volume of issues
cannot be set beforehand
the other methods (monetary or not) of financing the
budget deficit (Treasury bills, Treasury deposits of State25. Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/15
agencies, calls on saving, recourse to the central bank)
cannot be the subject of set predictions, and must be
managed with as much flexibility as possible to take
account of the sitUation, the reactions of agents other
than general government, etc.
However, all members agree (although with varying degrees
of insistence) that it might be useful to indicate beforehand
and to make an effort to coordinate within the Community,
how far monetary financing is intended to be used for any
bodget deficit.
(b)  The fixing of quantitative monetary targets
In 1976 the Monetary Committee considered the problem of
fixing quantitative monetary targets for monetary policy,
and submitted a report to the Council and the Commission
the main conclusions of which were approved by the
Council of 8 November 1976. The members of the
Committee would like to reiterate these conclusions. They
expressed diverse opinions on the proposals now submitted
by the Commission:
(i) For some members, who do not apply such targets, it
would seem neither possible nor desirable to
contemplate extending the use of such targets
throughout the Community. Within this group,
however, there are some who take the view that no
form of coordination between themselves and the
countries with such targets is realistically feasible
whereas others advocate the use of special reference
indicators aimed at promoting joint action with the
countries applying such quantitative targets.
(ii) For yet another group of members, the divergences in
question ought not to be exaggerated. Harmonization
of monetary policy instruments could not be regarded
as a  sine qua non  for harmonization of monetary
policy. It is possible to pursue common policy objectives
by applying different instruments each of which would
be tailored to the circumstances obtaining in the
country of application.
(iii) For others whose countries apply quantitative
monetary targets, the difficulty is still one of comparing
elements the bases and significance of which are quite
different. These members believe that a prerequisite to a
concrete effort towards harmonization and coordi-
nation of monetary policies would be a willingness on
the part of member countries which adopt different
types of targets to make available the implicit counter-
part projections in terms of a common reference
aggregate, with respect to internal and external
components.
(iv) Finally, some members consider that since economic
policy in Member States should increasingly aim at
achieving the objectives of growth in economic activity
and employment, monetary policy should now playa
greater role in assisting the recovery and that interest
rate manipulation and controls over the channels of
liquidity creation should be the main instruments used.
Moving on from this general discussion
Committee has examined various technical
Commission s proposal:
Should the quantitative guidelines chosen take the form
of a bracket or a single reference indicator? Many of the
Committee s members feel that a bracket would afford
greater flexibility than a single reference indicator, even
the Monetary
aspects of the
if coupled with a margin of tolerance either way. Some
members, however, emphasized the drawback of a
bracket, namely that it cast an aura of inviolability over
the limits to the margin of fluctuation authorized under
it. The general feeling is that this technical matter can be
dealt with differently in each of the counq:ies concerned
so as to avoid any form of rigidity.
Should the Council of Ministers or the Committee of
Governors be the Community body responsible for join,
action and coordination? Monetary policy is a matter for
the central banks in most Member States but it must also
be seen in the context of general economic policy.
Should the Community body chosen act by way of
decision or merely recognition of the situation? The
second procedure would be more acceptable as regards
the constitutional set-up in all Member States.
Could the movement towards alignment of national
monetary targets or of the indicators that would be
introduced instead result in the choices made at national
level being challenged at the end of the concertation
procedure? All the members take the view that such a
development would be  logical consequence of the
coordination exercise, but do not pretend that something
which can only be the result of strong political determi-
nation and improved convergence of economic situations
could be achieved overnight. They consider that, for the
time being, substantial headway could be made by
exchanging information and highlighting any
inconsistencies. Some even feel that more decisive steps
should be taken now.
Should the targets be published? A majority of members
on the Committee is hesitant on this score. Once a target
is decided on, it is published at national level. To
require, on top of that, its publication at Community
level would not serve any great purpose even if it were
achieved and would underscore the futility of the
exercise if it were not achieved. Publication at
Community level would, therefore, be a pointless
constraint that could, without making any positive contri-
bution, prove to be a sensitive and controversial issue.
(c)  Exchange rate guidelines
When it examined the Dutch proposals for establishing
target zones for Community currencies, the Council, on
14 March 1977, invited both Committees to continue their
work and report regularly to it. The present Commission
proposal aims at a regular discussion in Council of the
exchange rate guidelines of Member States.
All the members of the Monetary Committee have
emphasized the key role played by external factors in market
developments and in Member States' exchange rate policies.
Coupled with the differences between Member States' ap-
proaches to exchange rates, this does not make it easier to
adopt, at the present stage or within the foreseeable future
a common stance on exchange rates. Under the circum-
stances, any requirement incumbent upon the Council to
discuss exchange rate matters regularly would be of little
use, not to say dangerous, considering the possible reper-
cussions on foreign exchange markets that Ministerial
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It would, in practice, be useful to draw a distinction between
, coordination and information. Coordination of exchange
rate policies is already discussed by the Governors of the
Central Banks either at their regular meetings or, should the
need arise, by telephone. As this arrangement worked well
it would not be wise to tamper with it. Where information is
concerned, market developments are known to all
concerned. Nevertheless, the economic context within which
market developments take place is discussed both by the
Committee of Governors and by the Monetary Committee,
with the members of both Committees being themselves
quite free to inform their governments of the matterS
discussed.
, Lastly, a majority of the members of the Committee take the
view that the Commission s wish that it be regularly brought
into discussions held by the Member States belonging to 'the
snake' could be examined informally by the ministers of
these countries but should not be referred to the Council as
a whole through official channels.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPROMISE
The Monetary Committee proposes that the Council, in its
consideration of the convergence of the overall objectives of
economic policy, should approach the question of coordi-
nation of monetary policy in the light of the three following
propOSItions:
1. When fixing their annual budget guidelines, Member
States would give indications  where possible, backed
up by figures relating at least to the order of magnitude
involved  showing how the methods envisaged for
25.
financing the budget deficit, or the use of the budget
surplus for the coming financial y~ar, are related to their
monetary objectives.
2. Member States in a position to do so would set
quantitative guidelines, in the form of a bracket or a
target which mayor may not incorporate a margin of
tolerance, relating to changes in a significant monetary
aggregate for each Member State concerned. The other
Member States would fix guidelines  where possible
quantitative guidelines  relating to alternative reference
indicators having general monetary implications, such as
the interest rate or exchange rate constraints. These
objectives of monetary policy would be analyzed and
discussed annually in the Committee of Central Bank
Governors and in the Monetary Committee who would
report to the Council on the compatibility of the
monetary objectives of Member States with each other
and with the wider economic objectives adopted by the
Council for member countries and for the Community.
The Council would consider the development of
monetary policies to assist the convergence of the
economies of member countries, taking cognizance of the
commitments entered into by Member States. Separate
publication of these commitments would not 
envisaged. Developments in the position of member
countries with respect to the objectives fixed according to
the procedure outlined above, will be examined perio-
dically by the two Committees and by the Council.
3. As for exchange rates, the Committee of Governors of
the Central Banks and 'the Monetary Committee should
extend their consultations on exchange rate trends, taking
account, in particular, of the incidence on these trends of
monetary, budgetary, credit and interest rate policies.
ANNEX III
OPINION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A THIRD COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE
1. At the request of the members appointed by the
Commission, the Monetary Committee at its session of 5
and 6 June 1978 examined a proposal for a Third Council
Directive amending the First Directive implementing Article
67 of the EEC Treaty. The conclusions of this examination
which were prepared by the Working Party on Securities
Markets, are presented in this report.
2. According to the representative of the Commission, the
proposed Third Directive is an integral part of the work
currently being done in the Council on the proposal fora
Directive for the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions regarding collective investment
undertakings for transferable securities (CIUTS)  C).  This
) By CIUTS should be understood unit trusts and investment companies who
satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 2 of the proposed coordination
Directive (Doc. COM(76) 152 final),
latter Directive is designed to coordinate national legislation
on CIUTS which still varies widely within the Community.
It is because of these variations that the First Directive for
the implementation of Article 67 of the EEC Treaty dated
11 May 1960 (added to and amended on 18 December
1962) had excluded the liberalization of securities issued by
the majority of CIUTS, i.e. units of unit trusts whether or
not dealt in on stock exchanges and shares of investment
companies not dealt in on stock exchanges  C).  SO that the
envisaged coordination of national legislation on CIUTS has
real meaning it is essential, that in parallel with the
implementation of the coordination Directive, the necessary
measures to abolish exchange control restrictions on the free
circulation of securities issued by CIUTS be taken. The
(') Operations in these securities which are currently in List C have been
unconditionally liberalized by Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, while the
other Member State have maintained exchange control restrictions invoking
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liberalization of these operations which is the objective of
the proposed Tqird Directive would make a significant step
towards greater inter-penetration of national securities
markets. The Commission therefore emphasizes that without
such parallelism, the progress and outcome of the work
being done on coordination could very well be adversely
influenced.
3. Members emphasize their attachment to the objective
of developing a European capital market which was recently
reaffirmed by the Commission in its communication to the
European Council on the prospects of economic and
monetary union.
4. Despite this unanimity, OpinIOn was divided on the
practical measures regarding CIUTS which could be taken
immediately.
5. Some members support the proposals contained in the
proposed Third Directive without reservation. The proposed
liberalization would have particular significance given that it
would be a concrete expression of the Community
willingness not to further delay the implementation of
Article 67 of the Treaty, following the numerous checks
which the Community has suffered in this field. In addition
according to these members, the liberalization Directive
constitutes an indispensible complement to the coordination
Directive given that the coordination of national legislation
on: CIUTS would only be meaningful if the free circulation
of securities issued by these organizations occur simul-
taneously or within a very short period: in particular they
note that the ma:intenance of existing restrictions would
render the provlSlons of the coordination Directive on the
marketing of shares of CIUTS in the other Member States
inoperative. For this reason, these members consider that
without the prospect of a parallel liberalization, some of
these provisions would no longer be acceptable, especially
those of a particularly binding nature.
6. The other members consider that coordination can be
useful in itself but also recognize the existence of links
between the two Directives. Because of this they share the
opinion that as far as possible the coordination Directive
and liberalization Directive should be implemented in
parallel. It was noted that on the one hand the coordination
Directive contains a number of definitions and rules which
will affect the Third Directive, but that on the other hand
the work on the coordination Directive is far from being
completed. Some of these members also think that the libera-
lization Directive raises a number of problems and uncer-
tainties, particularly with regard to balances of payments
and capital markets. Under these circumstances, all these
members feel that it would be premature, to pronounce upon
the proposed Third Directive until work on the coordination
Directive is further advanced.
7. All members, although, recognIZing the divergences
which arose, emphasize the importance they attach to the
objectiv~ of liberalizing capital movements. The majority of
members, however, consider that a definitive solution to the
specific problem submitted to them can only be found in the
light of the progress in the work on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions governing
CIUTS.